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This chapter examines changing social attitudes in post-apartheid South Africa, 
asking whether the African middle classes have distinctive social attitudes, 
relative to poorer or lower class African people, whether this has changed over 
the 2000s, and thus how the rapid growth of the African middle classes is 
affecting social and political life. The chapter uses survey data (from the 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation’s South African Reconciliation 
Barometer) to show that the African middle classes assess much more positively 
than the poor the economic changes that have taken place in post-apartheid 
South Africa, and that this differential has grown over time. The middle classes 
are aware of their privilege, but may underestimate the challenges facing the 
poor. They are also more positive about improved inter-racial relations since 
1994, perhaps because they enjoy very much more inter-racial interaction than 
do the poor. In terms of public policy, the middle classes support affirmative 
action more strongly, but are also more likely to say that the government does 
too much for people and probably see less need for active policies around 
employment creation. Simple multivariate models indicate uneven class and 
race effects on selected social attitudes. Overall, the growth of the African 
middle classes seems to be good for race relations but may reduce the likelihood 





Probably the most striking social change in post-apartheid South Africa has been 
the explosive growth of the ‘African’ elite and ‘middle classes’. Apartheid had 
battered the African (and ‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’) middle classes in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but from the 1970s there was accelerating upward mobility by 
African people into semi-professional and white collar occupations (Crankshaw, 
1997). This process accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s, and carried forward into 
professional and managerial occupations, as well as the ranks of the economic, 
political and social elites (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005; 2015). For many African 
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people, the ‘new’ South Africa was a land of opportunity and rising prosperity. 
The extreme case was Patrice Motsepe: born in 1962, without inherited wealth, 
but with net worth of almost $3 billion in the 2000s. Motsepe was the only black 
dollar billionaire, but a growing minority – about 8,000 in 2012 – of South 
Africa’s dollar millionaires were black.1 In 1994, only about one in four people 
in the richest income quintile (i.e. the richest one-fifth of the population) were 
African.2 By 2008, this proportion had doubled, to 50 percent.3 Significant 
numbers of people shared in this upward mobility. Whilst the precise rate of 
growth depends on the definition of the ‘middle class’ (Burger et al., 2015a), 
most definitions and studies pointed to strong growth. ‘Four million and rising’, 
proclaimed the Unilever Institute for Strategic Marketing at the University of 
Cape Town in 2012.4 Visagie (2015) found even stronger growth, with the 
number of African people in the middle and upper ‘classes’ growing from 2.2 
million in 1993 to 5.4 million in 2008. 
 
Opportunities did not open for all, however (World Bank, 2012). Poverty 
persisted in the ‘new’ South Africa as people, especially in supposedly rural 
areas, experienced the combination of chronic unemployment and landlessness. 
The result was a marked growth in inequalities within the African population 
(Leibbrandt et al., 2012: 25-26). Growing differentiation or even stratification 
within the African population was a major cause of the changing relationship 
between race and class in South Africa. Whilst most white South Africans 
remained privileged and the poor were overwhelmingly African, it was no 
longer the case that African people were excluded from privilege (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005; 2015).  
 
This chapter explores whether and how the process of ‘middle class’ formation 
within the African population has affected social attitudes in post-apartheid 
South Africa, focussing on the ways that African, ‘middle class’ South Africans 
perceive racial, class and gender inequalities. The chapter is a contribution to the 
literature on the African middle class in South Africa. This literature, like the 
African middle class itself, has both deep historical roots and recent rapid 
growth. In the 1950s, the largely Weberian literature on the African middle 
classes tended to emphasise the social and cultural distinctiveness of the African 
middle classes (Wilson and Mafeje, 1963; Kuper, 1965; Brandel-Syrier, 1971; 
Seekings, 2009). In the 1980s and 1990s, many studies tended to downplay 
differences between the re-emerging African middle class and other classes. 
                                           
1 Business Day Live, 15th November 2012; 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/2013/11/15/black-dollar-millionaire-numbers-rocket. 
2 The precise figure differed between censuses and surveys (see Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: 
306). 




Modisha (2007), for example, studied the ‘contradictory class location’ of 
African managers (the ‘corporate middle class’): Whilst middle class in terms of 
occupation and residential location, many retained enduring links to – and 
identities with – the working-class communities from which they came. In their 
study of Soweto (Johannesburg), Alexander et al. (2013) emphasise the 
commonalities between different sections of the population of Soweto, in part 
because even people who could afford more – and identified themselves as 
being ‘in the middle’ – were vulnerable to impoverishment and were tied to 
poorer neighbours and kin; their privileges were precarious. These 
understandings of the African middle class contrast with the portrayal in other 
academic studies, most of which rely on ethnographic research (e.g. Nkuna, 
2006; Chipkin, 2012; Seekings, 2014b; Newman and De Lannoy, 2014; 
Chevalier, 2015; Krige, 2015), as well as in novels (notably, Kopano Matlwa’s 
2007 novel Coconut) which emphasise the consumerist and individualistic 
distinctions claimed and asserted by the new middle classes. 
 
This chapter uses quantitative data from the South African Reconciliation 
Barometer (SARB) surveys between 2003 and 2013 to plot the changing social 
and economic profile of South Africa’s majority African population, and to 
explore the relationship between this and changing perceptions of race and class 
inequalities. The SARB data suggest that the growing African middle classes 
have somewhat distinctive social attitudes on both race and class inequalities, 
and in some respects they have become more distinctive over time. The African 
middle classes tend to be more positive about changes in ‘race relations’, which 
is encouraging, and about economic changes, which risks complacency and 
indifference to the poor. The chapter compares the attitudes of different classes 
within the African population, but does not explore the possible indirect effects 
of the growth of the African ‘middle class’ on the attitudes and beliefs of white, 
Indian and coloured South Africans. In the final section, however, I examine 
race and class effects by modelling selected attitudes across the entire South 
African population. I find evidence of uneven race and class effects on social 
attitudes. This paper does not explore political attitudes, which have been 
analysed by Mattes (2014). 
 
This chapter focuses on the South African case, but South Africa is not unique. 
Other racially oppressive societies – the USA, Brazil – have also experienced 
dramatic growth in the black middle class, subverting the historical relationships 
between race and class in these societies. Research in Brazil has found that 
upward mobility among black Brazilians is associated with ‘whitening’, as the 
newly rich see themselves and are seen by others as more ‘white’ and less 
‘black’ than before (Schwartzman, 2007). In the USA, a series of studies of 
African-American middle classes points to the complexity of their identities, 
interests and behaviours (see Pattillo-McCoy, 2000, on Chicago, and Lacy, 
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2007, on Washington D.C.). In addition, the study of the middle classes has 
recently exploded across much of the global South, as the middle classes 
themselves have grown in size and importance (see, for examples, Heiman et al., 
2011; Fernandes, 2006, Baviskar and Ray, 2011, on India; Liechty, 2002, on 
Nepal; Darbon, 2011, on Africa). Further research will compare the South 
African case with the evidence from other societies. 
 
 
Conceptualising and measuring the ‘middle 
class(es)’ 
 
There is, of course, no consensus over how to conceptualise or measure the 
‘middle classes’ in South Africa (or anywhere else). Burger et al. (2015) identify 
three approaches to this, focusing respectively on income (primarily in the work 
of economists), occupations (in the work of sociologists) and self-identification. 
The first two of these approaches are themselves heterogeneous, with 
economists divided in terms of whether the ‘middle classes’ should refer to 
income strata in the middle of the income distribution, or richer, non-poor 
income strata (see also Visagie, 2015), whilst sociologists have long been 
divided between Marxian and Weberian approaches (see Seekings and Nattrass, 
2005; Alexander et al., 2013). 
 
Economists tend to focus on income. For them, ‘class’ means ‘income category’. 
Visagie reports that the combination of the elite and middle strata comprised 20 
percent of the population in 1993 and 24 percent in 2008. The rising number of 
African people in the ‘middle class’ massively offset the decline in the number 
of white people in this ‘class’ (Visagie and Posel, 2013; Visagie, 2015). With a 
slightly more inclusive definition, Burger and McAravey (2014) calculate that 
the proportion rose from 28 percent in 1993 to 48 percent in 2012. The 
proportion of the African population in these categories rose from 8 to 15 
percent (in Visagie’s analysis) and from 12 to 40 percent (in Burger and 
McAravey’s). However, these studies suffer from the problem of growing 
under-reporting of income (see Yu, 2013; Seekings, 2014a), so probably 
underestimate the growth of the ‘middle class’. 
 
Sociologists tend to focus more on the occupational structure than on the income 
structure. Initial studies used census data to conclude that deindustrialisation had 
led to a more polarised ‘post-Fordist’ class structure in South African cities, 
with growth in both high-income and low-wage jobs but shrinking middle-
income employment, primarily because employment in services was more 
differentiated than industrial employment. Crankshaw (2012) argued that these 
findings were based on flawed data. In South African cities, both he and others 
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found, middle-income manufacturing jobs were replaced by middle-income 
white-collar service sector jobs. Within each of manufacturing and services, 
lower-skill and -wage jobs continued to be replaced by higher-skill and –income 
ones. The result was not so much occupational polarization as a process of 
‘professionalisation’ (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2008; Selzer and Heller, 
2010; Crankshaw, 2012; Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014). 
 
Household survey data – encompassing all households, not just employed 
individuals – present broadly consistent findings. Figure 1 shows the distribution 
of households between three broad strata, each comprising several classes, in 
2008 (using data from the first wave of the National Income Dynamics Study, 
NIDS). There have been only small changes in the class structure since the end 
of apartheid (analysed in Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). This is unsurprising, 
given that the economy remained capitalist with enduringly high unemployment. 
The structural changes, whilst small, are nonetheless revealing. The ‘upper 
classes’ grew and accounted for a larger share of total income. The lower middle 
and working classes shrank marginally in proportion to the (growing) total 
population, due primarily to the shrinking core working class, but grew in 
absolute terms. The ‘lower’ classes overall shrank marginally but maintained 
their income share (primarily due to redistribution and decommodification 
through government grants and pensions). This is not a simple story to interpret: 
The rich prospered, as they did in the new ‘gilded age’ that characterised most 
capitalist societies in the early 2000s. But they did not do so primarily at the 
expense of the poor. Poverty declined at the same time as the rich prospered. It 
is in the middle that the story gets more complex. What might be called the 
lower middle classes – comprising skilled and white-collar workers – expanded. 
The ‘core working class’, comprising less skilled workers in industrial 
employment and agricultural or domestic employment, shrank dramatically. The 
‘marginal working class’, comprising less skilled workers in agricultural or 
domestic employment, forming part of the ‘lower classes’ in Figure 1, also 
shrank. This reflected the decline of less skilled industrial employment, due in 
large part to the changing skill composition of the workforce, as mechanisation 
resulted in a shift from less to more skilled, and from blue- to white-collar, 












3 ‘upper’ classes, defined by occupation 
(managerial or professional), wealth or 
(substantial) business activity: 
12% of households, 45% of income 
 
4 classes in a middle position: the semi-
professional class, intermediate class, core 
working class and petty traders: 
48% of households, 45% of income 
 
3 ‘lower’ classes: the marginal working class, 
underclass (defined in terms of systematic 
disadvantage in the labour market) and a 
residual ‘other’ category: 














Note: Calculated using NIDS data 
Source: Seekings and Nattrass, 2005.  
 
Figure 1: The Class Structure of South Africa, 2008   
 
 
In earlier work I generally avoided using the term ‘middle class’ because of 
uncertainty over precisely what this might usefully mean in the South African 
context. The conventional ‘lower middle class’ would comprise most of what I 
labelled the ‘semi-professional’ and ‘intermediate’ classes. They have grown 
since the end of apartheid, although only a little faster than the population as a 
whole. In 1993 these two classes included 24 percent of South African 
households. By 2008 this proportion had risen to 27 percent. Over the same 
period these households’ incomes rose (but not as fast as the incomes of even 
richer households, with the result that their share of total national income 
actually fell).5 The overall class structure has not changed dramatically. What 
has changed is the racial composition of these classes, with significant upward 
mobility by black South Africans into these ‘lower middle classes’ (see 
Seekings and Nattrass, 2015: Chapter 5).  
 
A third approach to classification might rely on the self-classification of South 
Africans. Burger et al. (2015a: 35) report the longitudinal data on self-reported 
social class in South Africa collected in surveys conducted as part of the World 
Values Survey (WVS) (see Table 1). It is hard to discern any clear trend 
between 1995 and 2013. Indeed, the sharp rises between 2001 and 2006 in self-
identification as ‘lower class’ or between 2006 and 2013 in self-identification as 
‘working class’ (and concomitant decline between 2006 and 2013 in self-
identification as middle or upper class) fly in the face of the trends identified 
using income or occupational data. 
                                           
5 This is probably true even if allowance is made for significant under-reporting of incomes. 
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Table 1: Self-reported social class, 1995-2013 
 
 1995 (%) 2001 (%) 2006 (%) 2013 (%) 
Lower class 42.5 26.4 43.9 44.9 
Working class 24.1 30.8 18.9 24.9 
Lower middle class 16.6 21.0 19.5 17.3 
Upper middle class 15.4 18.5 15.2 11.5 
Upper class 1.4 3.2 2.4 1.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: World Values Survey, reported in Burger et al., 2015a: 35. 
 
The data for 2006 are, however, consistent with 2008 data from the first wave of 
the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) on self-placement in the income 
distribution. NIDS asked its respondents to locate themselves in the income 
distribution by imagining a six-step ladder on which the poorest people stood on 
the lowest step and the richest on the top step. Very few respondents (less than 
10 percent) said they were on the top two steps, just as very few people identify 
themselves as ‘upper class’. One in three said they were on one or other of the 
bottom two steps, just as more or less the same proportion identify themselves as 
‘lower class’. Almost 60 percent said that they were on one of the two middle 
steps – which is about the same proportion who identify themselves as ‘working 
class’, ‘lower middle class’ or ‘upper middle class’ (Burger et al., 2015a). 
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any comparable data from the 1990s 
that would allow analysis of change over time. 
 
Other scholars have argued that ‘middle class’ means very different things to 
different people. In Alexander et al.’s thorough study of Soweto, being ‘in the 
middle’ generally meant being able to afford some non-essential goods. A 
‘middle class’ identity in Soweto was consistent with a ‘working class’ identity 
in the workplace (Alexander et al., 2013). Khunou (2015) also points to the 
disparate meanings of being ‘middle class’. It seems likely that middle class has 
a different meaning in Cape Town (see Seekings, 2007a) than in Soweto. 
Without considerably better understanding of identity formation, self-
identification appears to be a particularly problematic measure of what it is to be 




Burger et al. (2015a) and most other recent contributions6 to the South African 
debate on class tend to ignore a fourth approach, even though it was of crucial 
importance for renewing interest in the black middle class in post-apartheid 
South Africa. In the 2000s marketing researchers discovered that there was a 
large new ‘class’ of (mostly black) consumers who enjoyed a ‘living standard’ 
beyond the basic necessities. The concept of the ‘black diamond’ was coined by 
researchers at the Unilever Institute at the University of Cape Town, to refer to 
the very top end of this new class. The Unilever Institute’s 2010 documentary 
Forerunners provided a powerful account of the changes experienced by this 
new elite, and how the elite responded.7 The advertising and marketing industry8 
generally avoided income-based measures, and developed instead ‘Living 
Standard Measures’ (or LSMs) based on asset ownership, use of financial 
services and selected other variables, without consideration of income. The 
underlying conceptualisation seems to be that consumer behaviour is not driven 
simply (or primarily) by current income, and that measures of asset ownership 
and use of financial services take into account preferences and tastes as well as 
income. High-LSM households might therefore be asset-rich but cash-poor. The 
precise measurement of LSMs has changed several times, particularly in 
2000/01. Until then, the population was divided into eight LSMs. Thereafter, 
and using a revised set of variables, the top two LSMs were divided into four, 
giving a set of ten LSMs in total (see Boehme et al., 2007).  
 
Most social scientists ignore the LSMs, without explaining why.9 Yet the LSMs 
might be viewed as operationalising, imperfectly, a Bourdieusian approach to 
social classification that integrates social distinctions into the analysis of 
economic privilege. For Bourdieu, the economic inequalities of class are 
reproduced in part through the exercise of everyday classification – i.e. through 
labelling and self-identification – that rely heavily on social and cultural cues.10 
The study of class in South Africa would benefit from a fuller engagement with 
Bourdieu, as I have argued previously (Seekings, 2007b; 2008). This is 
                                           
6 Chevalier (2015) is a notable recent exception. Schlemmer (2005) combined LSMs with 
income and occupational data to define the ‘core middle class’ in the first part of his analysis. 
7 http://www.uctunileverinstitute.co.za/research/forerunners/. 
8 Specifically, the South African Audience Research Foundation (SAARF), called the South 
African Advertising Research Foundation until 2010. 
9 Ironically, Van der Berg et al. (2008) used LSMs in their analysis of poverty trends but 
disregarded them in their more recent account of different approaches to class (Burger et al., 
2015a). 
10 A Bourdieusian approach was operationalised in the recent ‘Great British Class Project’ 
through asking questions about social capital (acquaintance with people in selected 
occupations of varying status) and cultural capital (measuring leisure, musical, eating and 
holiday preferences) as well as economic capital (measured in terms of savings and property-




especially true of the African middle class – as is evident in novels such as 
Coconut, which I read as Bourdieusian texts, detailing the cultural bases of the 
new elite’s claimed distinction and privilege. The marketing and advertising 
industry presumably employ LSMs because they accord with patterns of 
consumer preference and behaviour. Whilst there is little or no existing research 
into whether LSMs also correlate with other social and political behaviours, or 
do so better than other measures of class, the use of LSMs should not be 
dismissed out of hand.  
 
LSM data emphasise the pace of social and economic change since 1994. The 
proportion of the South African population classified in the top three LSMs in 
the earlier 8-LSM scheme rose from about 33 percent in 1994 to 44 percent in 
2006. The proportion in the equivalent top five LSMs in the later 10-LSM 
scheme rose from 44 percent in 2007 to 62 percent in 2014. However the 
‘middle’ is defined, it seems to have grown: The proportion in LSMs 6 through 
8 (using the 10-LSM scheme) rose from 27 percent in 1993 to 45 percent in 
2014 (see Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2: South African population by LSM 
 
LSMs 
Old LSMs New LSMs 
1994 (%) 2000 (%) 2006 (%) 2007 (%) 2014 (%) 
1-4 55 44 37 42 22 
5 14 18 19 14 16 
6 14 17 21 16 23 
7 
13 14 17 
9 13 
8 6 9 
9 
6 7 6 
7 10 
10 6 7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
   Source: www.saarf.co.za. 
 
 
Income, occupational and LSM data tell a broadly consistent story, although the 
details differ. The shifts from less to more skilled blue-collar work and from 
blue- to white-collar work combined with rising earnings for more skilled 
working people, to generate rising real earnings for many (even most) people in 
formal employment. These, perhaps together with the expansion of formal 
housing and improved municipal infrastructure and services, led to expanded 
asset ownership and access to services (as measured in the LSMs) and, perhaps, 
changing consumption patterns. The LSMs suggest that prosperity was shared 
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more widely than was revealed by income data, presumably because ownership 
of household assets and use of financial and other services (included in the LSM 
classifications) expanded faster than incomes. The identity data are discrepant, 
but it is not clear how one should interpret changes at the national level in self-
reported class identity. 
 
 
Measuring the middle classes using data from 
the South African Reconciliation Barometer 
 
Between 2003 and 2013, thirteen surveys were conducted for the Institute of 
Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), for its South African Reconciliation Barometer 
(SARB). The surveys formed parts of omnibus surveys conducted by the market 
researchers IPSOS Markinor. Some questions were included in every round, but 
others were specific to one or a few rounds. IPSOS Markinor also provided data 
on LSMs,11 and rather poor data on incomes and occupations. However, there 
are no data collected on self-identification. The samples were large, varying 
between 3,289 and 3,590, with a total of more than 45,000 respondents across 
all thirteen rounds. Metropolitan areas, and hence LSMs 6-10, were over-
sampled. Non-metropolitan areas, and hence LSMs 1-5, were under-sampled. 
The analysis below uses reweighted data.12 
 
The SARB data demonstrate the steady growth of the share of the African 
population in the top and middle LSM categories (see Figure 2). The proportion 
of African households in LSMs 1-5 dropped from 85 percent to 49 percent. The 
proportion in LSMs 6-8 rose from 15 percent to 46 percent. The proportion in 
the elite LSMs 9 and 10 rose from less than 1 percent to more than 5 percent. 
For our purposes, LSMs 6-8 might be viewed as corresponding to the ‘lower 
middle classes’ (including many households whose breadwinners might also 
consider themselves to be working class, at least in the workplace), whilst LSMs 
9 and 10 correspond to the ‘upper middle classes’. The elite are unlikely to be 
represented in a sample of this size and survey of this kind. Both the African 
                                           
11 LSM data were missing for round 9 (2009). Most of the variables used to construct LSMs 
were available however. Using the formula at the time, I scored households on the LSM 
variables. One important negative variable (radios) was missing, which might explain why the 
LSM scores seemed inflated. I adjusted the LSM scores by arbitrarily allocating the lowest 70 
percent of households to the lower class category, the next 26 percent of households to the 
‘lower middle class’ and the top 4 percent of households to the ‘upper middle class’. Further 
details are available on request. 
12 IPSOS Markinor have not explained how the weights were derived, but we assume that 
they adjust for both sampling design and non-response. 
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lower and upper middle classes grew dramatically between 2003 and 2013 (the 




Figure 2: Black Population by LSM 
 
 
However, a caveat needs to be added here. The SARB data – even weighted – 
do not match the data published by the SAARF itself on the national distribution 
of households by LSM. In 2007, according to the SAARF, 56 percent of all 
households (i.e. of all racial or population groups) were in LSMs 1-5. The 
weighted SARB data for the same year put 72 percent of all households in these 
LSMs. The SAARF put 31 percent of households in LSMs 6-8, compared to 18 
percent of SARB households (using weights). The SAARF put 13 percent of all 
households in LSMs 9 and 10, whereas the weighted SARB data put only 11 
percent of all households into these LSMs. In other words, the SAARF data 
show many fewer lower-LSM households and more middle- and high-LSM 
households. It is impossible to make sense of these discrepancies without more 
information on both samples and weights from the SAARF and IPSOS 
Markinor, who conducted the fieldwork for the SARB; this information is not 
available. This need not matter for our purposes, however. This chapter is 
concerned not with measuring precisely the growth of the black middle classes, 
but rather with examining whether these classes have distinct social attitudes. 
This chapter focuses on the relative attitudes, not the relative size, of these 
classes. 
 
The SARB data include some data on incomes and occupations, but these are 
not amenable to precise construction of class categories. Income was recorded in 
bands which were fixed in nominal terms, making it difficult to construct a 
longitudinal measure of real income (i.e. taking inflation into account). In 
addition, there are missing data. There are also good reasons for believing that, 
                                           
13 Given the small number of households in the upper middle class in the early years, these 
data should be treated with due caution. 
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in all surveys, many South African individuals and households under-report 
their earnings or incomes, and that this under-reporting worsened over time (Yu, 
2013; Seekings, 2014a). The SARB occupational data also pose challenges. The 
data are coded at the one-digit ISCO (International Standard Classification of 
Occupations) level, with no data on industry or sector. The category ‘self-
employed’ does not distinguish between the survivalist hawker and the 
shopkeeper with his or her own employees. Moreover, the occupational data are 
for individuals, and are available only for the respondent, and not for other 
household members. This means that it would be very difficult if not impossible 
to identify a household class position. If the respondent records his or her 
employment status as unemployed or not in the labour force, then we have no 
information on whether the breadwinner is a highly-paid professional or a 
farmworker, or if there is no breadwinner.  
 
Tables A1 and A2 (in the Appendix) show that there are inexact correlations 
between household LSM, household income and individual occupations, using 
data from round 11 of the SARB (2011). Almost all of the households with 
reported incomes below R3,000 per month (in 2011 prices) were in LSMs 1 
through 5. A small minority of low-income households were in LSMs 6-8. 
These were likely to have included households which had experienced a loss of 
earnings, because the breadwinner had retired, died, left or become unemployed. 
At the top end of the income hierarchy, households with the highest incomes 
were almost all in LSMs 6 through 8 or LSMs 9 and 10. But some high-income 
households – i.e. households in approximately the 8th and 9th income deciles – 
were in LSMs 1 through 5. These were cash-rich but asset-poor households, 
perhaps because household income had grown relatively recently, and asset 
accumulation might have been stalled also by the number of dependents to be 
supported. Table A2 shows that the relationship between LSMs and occupation 
or work status is also imprecise. Most professional or managerial employees are 
in the LSMs 6 or higher, but some are in the lower LSMs. Most unskilled 
workers are in the lower LSMs, but some are in LSMs 6 or higher. It is 
impossible to say with any certainty whether LSMs are a good proxy for a more 
orthodox sociological conception of class. The SARB data unfortunately do not 
include any measures of self-identified class. 
 
Given the imprecise relationship between LSMs and the income and 
occupational measures of ‘class’, it is important to assess the robustness of 
findings on the relationship between any one measure of ‘class’ and attitudes, 
beliefs or behaviours. The Appendix examines whether the findings using LSMs 
(reported in the main text) are robust to alternative specifications of ‘class’, 




Assessments of social and economic change 
 
African middle class South Africans are much more likely to say that their 
financial situation and their living conditions had improved, and less likely to 
say that they had worsened, over the preceding year.14 They were also much 
more likely to say in 2011-13 that their personal economic circumstances had 
improved since 1994 (see Table 3). Two-thirds of the respondents in LSMs 9-10 
(or upper middle class) said that their circumstances had improved, with only 10 
percent saying that they had worsened. In LSMs 1-5, in contrast, only one-third 
of respondents said that their circumstances had improved, and almost as many 
said they had worsened. Respondents in LSMs 6-8 (or lower middle class) 
tended to be positive, but less clearly than the high-LSM respondents.  
 
 












Improved a great deal 5 10 22 7 
Improved somewhat 28 39 44 33 
About the same 38 32 23 35 
Worsened somewhat 18 14 7 16 
Worsened a great deal 9 4 3 7 
Don’t know 3 2 1 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: SARB, variable econcirc94, weighted data, rounds 11, 12 and 13 only; African people only. 
 
 
Most higher-LSM respondents were also aware of their relative privilege. In 
2011 and 2013, the SARB asked respondents to compare their living conditions 
with those of most other South Africans (see Table 4). Two out of three 
respondents in LSMs 9-10 said that their living conditions were better or a lot 
better than most other South Africans’. Only one-quarter of the LSM 1-5 




                                           




Table 4: Relative living conditions by LSM, 2011 and 2013 
 
How do your living conditions 
compare with those of most 








Better or a great deal better 24 42 66 32 
About the same 43 40 24 41 
Worse or a great deal worse 31 16 9 25 
Don’t know 2 2 <1 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: SARB, variable livconSA, weighted data, rounds 11 and 13 only; African people only. 
 
 
High LSM respondents were also more positive about changes in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Beginning with the 2007 round, respondents were asked to 
compare the South Africa of today with the country it was in 1994, when it 
became a democracy’, with respect to a series of issues. Asked about 
employment opportunities, about one half of the high-LSM respondents said that 
they had improved somewhat or a great deal (see Figure 3). Almost as many 
high-LSM respondents said that employment opportunities had worsened (not 
shown), but the overall assessment was more positive than negative. Among 
low-LSM respondents, however, few said that employment opportunities had 
improved (see Figure 3), whilst twice as many said that they had worsened, so 
that the overall assessment was massively negative. Respondents in LSMs 6-8 
were in between the two other groups in terms of their assessments. 
 
This same pattern is mirrored with respect to whether the ‘gap between rich and 
poor’ had improved or worsened since 1994 (see Figure 4). The high-LSM 
group show a clear trend (2010 notwithstanding) of rising agreement that the 
gap had improved. Fewer respondents in the low-LSM group thought that the 
gap had improved and twice as many said that it had worsened (not shown). 









Figure 3: Assessment that employment opportunities have improved, by 






Figure 4: Assessment that the gap between rich and poor has improved, 
by LSM and year 
 
 
The question about ‘employment opportunities’ might have been understood as 
referring to the opportunities facing the respondent, so agreement that they had 
improved might reflect the reality that, for educated and skilled black people, 
opportunities did improve massively after 1994. The same logic cannot apply to 
the gap between rich and poor. Given that all data point to enduring or even 
worsening income inequalities over time, the relatively positive assessment of 
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the higher-LSM respondents presumably reflects either their concern with the 
racial income gap or the gap between them and rich, white people, or their 
ignorance of the realities of inequality stretching out below and behind them.  
 
Higher-LSM respondents were also much more optimistic about the future. 
Asked in 2011 about their family’s lives in a year’s time, 70 percent of LSM 9-
10 respondents answered ‘better off than today’, 23 percent said ‘about the 
same’ and only 7 percent answered ‘worse off than today’. In LSMs 6-8, the 59 
percent were optimistic, 33 percent were neutral and 8 percent were pessimistic. 
In LSMs 1-5, however, only 40 percent were optimistic, 46 percent were neutral 
and 13 percent were negative.15 
 
In one round, in 2006, respondents were asked about the perceived causes of 
prosperity. They were asked to assess how strong was the influence of each of a 
series of factors on the ‘individual prosperity of ordinary South Africans’. The 
list of factors comprised: level of education, hard work, religious belief, family, 
work experience, race, health, political connections, luck, social class of parents, 
location (urban or rural), gender and the legacy of apartheid. Almost all African 
respondents assessed that education (88 percent) and hard work (79 percent) had 
a strong or very strong influence (see Table 5). These were followed by work 
experience and health. The precise ranking differed, however, between the high 
LSM respondents and the rest. More of the high LSM respondents rated hard 



















                                           
15 Variable imyear. 
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Source: SARB, weighted data, round 6 only; African people only; other factors that were ranked lower included 




A series of studies of the African middle class – as well as novels and media 
reports – focus on consumerism and individualism (Nkuna, 2006; Kaus, 2013; 
Burger et al., 2015b). The SARB data point to other aspects of the middle class 
worldview: Positive assessments of economic change (and optimism about the 
prospects of further change), a sense of privilege, and a more pronounced 
tendency to attribute success to hard work. These findings are consistent with 
other recent work on discourses and ideologies of privilege among African men 
and women. In Cape Town, I found that the African lower middle class 
distinguish themselves sharply from lower classes through a discourse that 
contrasts their own ‘independence’ with the latter’s ‘dependence’ on state (for 
housing or social grants) or kin (Seekings, 2014b). Telzak, drawing on 
interviews in Cape Town and the rural Eastern Cape, found that ‘successful’, 
upwardly-mobile young African men and women emphasise their hard work, 
which they contrast with the sloth or inertia of many other people (Telzak, 2012; 
2013; 2015). Chipkin (2012) and Krige (2015) show how the new middle 
classes from Soweto on the West Rand manage the claims made on them by 
poorer kin whilst asserting their own individuality and private ambitions. The 
privileges of class have to be legitimated. Class formation within the African 
population in the 2000s has been accompanied by the emergence of new 
ideologies and discourses of class (or at least the re-emergence or strengthening 
of these insofar as they have historical roots).  
18 
 
Attitudes around ‘race relations’ 
 
The quality of ‘race relations’ was, unsurprisingly, a major concern for the 
SARB. From 2007, the SARB asked respondents whether they thought that race 
relations had improved or worsened since 1994. The responses of African men 
and women differed by LSM. Higher LSM respondents were consistently more 
likely to agree that race relations had improved, and were less likely to disagree 
(see Figure 5). In most years, about two out of three high-LSM respondents 
agreed, whereas less than half of the low-LSM respondents did so; the ‘lower 
middle class’ category (LSM 6-8) were generally in between. The same pattern 
was evident in a question asked in 2011: “Would you say that the relationship 
between the different races in our country is improving, staying the same or 
getting worse?’16 Among LSM 1-5 respondents, 48 percent said ‘improving’, 42 
percent said ‘staying the same’ and 10 percent said ‘getting worse’. In LSM 6-8, 
the proportions were 55, 38 and 7 percent. In LSM 9-10, they were 64, 26 and 
10 percent. As Figure 5 shows, however, there does not appear to be any clear 








This pattern was evident also in responses to the statements ‘South Africans 
have made progress in reconciliation since the end of apartheid’17 and ‘My 
friends and family have experienced reconciliation since the end of apartheid’.18 
The responses (for pooled surveys) were: 57 percent (LSM 1-5), 65 percent 
                                           
16 Variable imrace. 
17 Variable recondex1 (2011-13). 
18 Variable recondex_new (2012-13). 
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(LSM 6-8) and 72 percent (LSM 9-10) for the first question, and 49 percent, 54 
percent and 57 percent for the second question. The differences were more 
modest for the second question, perhaps because it might be understood as 
asking whether the respondent was completely reconciled; many respondents 
answered that they were uncertain or did not know. 
 
Different assessments of race relations correlate closely with racial integration. 
In 2012, high LSM respondents reported that they were very much more likely 
to talk to white, Indian or coloured people on a daily basis (see Figure 6).19 More 
than one half of the people in LSM 9-10 said they did so ‘often’ or ‘always’, 









These differences were mirrored in data on how often respondents socialised at 
home with white, Indian or coloured people.20 Lower-LSM respondents were 
also slightly more likely to say that they struggle to understand the customs and 
ways of white, coloured and Indian people, but the differences are modest.21 
There were, however, almost no differences in the reported trustworthiness of 
white, coloured and Indian people.22 Respondents were also asked about their 
attitudes to inter-racial marriage. In 2012, high-LSM African respondents were 
more likely to say that they disapproved of their relatives marrying coloured 
                                           
19 Variable grouptalk_b. 
20 Variable socialise_b. 
21 Variable understand_b. 
22 Variable untrust_b. 
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people, but were slightly more likely to say that they approved of neighbours 
marrying white or Indian people.23 The importance of racial identity opposed to 
other identities did not vary significantly by LSM (nor did they change much 
over time).24 
 
In 2011, respondents were asked a set of questions concerning the importance of 
race in a range of situations: getting a job (in the public and private sectors), 
accessing educational opportunities (in school and college), and getting 
government contracts. High-LSM respondents were marginally more conscious 
of the importance of race, but the differences were small.25 
 
Overall, the African middle classes, and especially the ‘upper middle class’ 
(operationalised here as LSM 9-10) are more positive about improvements in 
race relations, perhaps because they experience much more racial integration, 
but perhaps also because they have enjoyed the benefits of the formal 
deracialisation of opportunities after the end of apartheid. The African middle 
classes appear to be much more positive about both class and racial inclusion 
than the African poor. 
 
 
Assessments of public policy 
 
The African middle classes appear to have somewhat distinctive social attitudes 
in relation to the poor majority of the African population. Does this matter? 
Mattes (2014) finds that class formation does not seem to have resulted in 
significantly more democratic attitudes or behaviours. In this section, I consider 
whether the attitudinal changes accompanying class formation have implications 
for the kinds of public policy that are demanded. 
 
The fact that higher-LSM African men and women assess changes in race 
relations more positively than lower-LSM African men and women does not 
mean that they are less supportive of racialised policies. There is no significant 
difference by LSM in whether African people agreed or disagreed with the 
statement that ‘It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all 
the different groups who live in this country’26, but higher-LSM men and women 
are more likely to agree that ‘It is possible to create one united South African 
                                           
23 Variables relmarry_b, relmarry_c, relmarry_i, relmarry_w. 
24 Variable identity1. 
25 Variables raceaffjob, raceaffprivate, raceaffschool, raceaffcollege, raceaffcontract (2011 
only). 
26 Variable unitdesire (2003-13). 
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nation’.27 Indeed, the African middle classes are somewhat more positive than 
the poor about past policies of affirmative action and they are more supportive 
also of continued affirmative action (see Table 6).28  
 
 
Table 6: Assessments of public policy around race, by LSM 
 










It is desirable to create one united South 
African nation out of all the different groups 
who live in this country 
unitdesire, 2003-13 72% 71% 74% 
It is possible to create one united South 
African nation out of all the different groups 
who live in this country 
unitposs, 2007-13 59% 62% 69% 
The government should continue to use racial 
categories to measure the impact of its 
programmes for previously disadvantaged 
communities 
racecats, 2005-13 47% 50% 52% 
It should be a national priority to make the 
workforce representative of all races 
reprace, 2007-13 64% 67% 73% 
Employment Equity policies have been 
successful in creating a workforce that 
represent the South African population 
r12_b16_6, 2012 
only 
45% 49% 61% 
 
Source: SARB, weighted data; African people only, selected years. 
 
 
The SARB questions about policies concerning class inequalities focused more 
on assessments of past or current government performance than on policy 
choices in future. Higher-LSM African men and women are more positive (or 
less negative) about past government performance, but are also more likely to 
view people as over-dependent on the government (see Table 7). This is 
consistent with the worldview that the state should promote equitable 
opportunities, allowing energetic or competent individuals to progress, and the 
assessment that this is what ANC governments had done since 1994.  
 
Higher-LSM people were also more likely to agree that ‘reconciliation is 
impossible as long as people who were disadvantaged under apartheid continue 
to be poor’. This might seem to imply a commitment to reduced inequalities, but 
                                           
27 Variable unitposs (2007-13). 
28 There is less enthusiasm among all classes of African people for Black Economic 
Empowerment policies (see variables beepolicies and beepolicies_new, asked in 2005 and 
2012). It is not clear whether this reflects beliefs about the idea of BEE or past practice. 
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it seems likely that what higher-LSM individuals understand by this question is 
‘reconciliation is impossible as long as race holds back their upward mobility’, 




Table 7: Assessments of public policy around economic inequalities, by 
LSM 
 












Government is doing well in getting young 
people into jobs: 
r12_b9_4, 2012-13 35% 44% 52% 
How well do you think the government is 
doing in reducing unemployment by 
creating jobs?  
imunemploy, 2011 
only 
27% 38% 39% 
Reconciliation is impossible as long as 
people who were disadvantaged under 
apartheid continue to be poor:  
reconimp, 2011-13 48% 52% 60% 
South Africans depend too much on 
government to change our lives:  
r12_b16_8, 2012-
13 
57% 62% 64% 
 
Source: SARB, weighted data; African people only, selected years. 
 
 
The African middle classes are clearly not ignorant or in denial of the economic 
difficulties facing many poor and especially young people in terms of 
unemployment. A substantial proportion is critical of government performance. 
But the African middle classes are more positive about progress than the poor. 
To some extent, either their own successes or their ideology of effort lead some 
African middle class men and women to views that risk complacency about the 
need for energetic pro-poor public policies. The SARB data unfortunately 




Modelling race and class effects on selected 
social attitudes 
 
The SARB data provide evidence of clear class effects on a range of social 
attitudes among African people and evidence that, in some cases at least, these 
effects have grown over time. If we extend the analysis to include non-African 
respondents in the SARB surveys, we can compare the effects of race and class 
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on selected attitudes. Table 8 reports the results of a series of multivariate probit 
regression models that distinguish between race and class effects in different 
ways. All of the models include controls for age, gender and year (i.e. round of 
the SARB), and use pooled data from 2007 to 2013. In the first pair of models 
the dependent variable is whether the respondent agrees that race relations have 
improved in South Africa since 1994.29 The first model (A1) regresses this on a 
set of dummy variables for different combinations of race and class: African 
people in LSMs 9-10, African people in LSMs 6-8, African people in LSMs 1-5, 
and non-African people in each of these three LSM categories. Compared to 
African people in LSMs 1-5, African men and women in the upper middle class 
(LSM 9-10) were 15 percentage points more likely and people in the lower 
middle class were 7 percentage points more likely to agree that inter-racial 
relationships had improved. Non-African people were less likely to say that 
inter-racial relationships had improved. Model A2 uses separate variables for 
race and class, showing how being in a higher LSM correlates with more 
positive assessments even controlling for race, whilst being in any non-African 
racial category correlated with more negative assessments even controlling for 
class.30 Further regression models (not shown in Table 9) indicate that the 
models are not improved by the inclusion of interaction effects between race and 
class categories.  
 
Models B1 and B2 repeat this exercise for a second dependent variable, i.e. 
whether the respondent agrees that employment opportunities have improved 
since 1994.31 The results are almost identical to the ones for race relations. Being 
in a higher class has a positive effect, and being non-African has a negative one. 
These models suggest that there are clear and discrete race and class effects, and 








                                           
29 Variable racerel, transformed into a dummy variable. 
30 Coloured and white people were more negative than Indian people, but the differences were 
small. 
31 Variable empopp, transformed into a dummy variable. 
32 Whilst the relationships are highly significant (mostly at the 0.01 level), the models as a 
whole explain only a very small part of the variance in social attitudes. One reason for this is 
methodological, in that the variables in the models are all dummy variables. A second reason 
is substantive: Many people in all classes think that race relations have got better, but are 





Table 8: Class and race effects on perceived progress since 1994 
 
 
Agree that race relations 
improved since 1994 
Agree that employment 
opportunities improved 
since 1994 
Model A1 Model A2 Model B1 Model B2 
African LSM 9-10 0.16***  0.19***  
African LSM 6-8 0.09***  0.09***  
African LSM 1-5 Omitted  Omitted  
Non-African LSM 9-10 -0.04**  -0.03**  
Non-African LSM 6-8 -0.06***  -0.06***  
Non-African LSM 1-5 -0.05  -0.07**  
LSM 9-10  0.10***  0.13*** 
LSM 6-8  0.08***  0.08*** 
LSM 1-5  Omitted  Omitted 
Not African  -0.12***  -0.13*** 
African  Omitted  Omitted 
n  23871 23871 24186 24186 
r squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 
Note: All models control for age, gender and year; all variables are dummy variables; data are weighted; models 
are probit regressions, reporting marginal effects; data are pooled but do not include data from 2009; significance 
reported at * 0.1  ** 0.05  *** 0.01. 
 
 
Table 9 reports one model for each of five further social attitudes: whether 
respondents agree that ‘the government is doing well in getting people into 
jobs’, whether their living conditions are better than ‘those of most other South 
Africans’, whether they agree that ‘it should be a national priority to make the 
workforce representative of all races’, whether they say that people are too 
dependent on government, and whether they think that hard work is the most 








                                           



























LSM 9-10 0.17*** 0.41*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
LSM 6-8 0.09*** 0.18*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.05* 
LSM 1-5 Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Not African -0.10*** -0.11*** 0.04*** -0.12*** 0.02*** 
African Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
n  6978 6969 23378 7152 3483 
r squared 0.02 0.03 0.02 <0.01 <0.01 
 
Note: All models control for age, gender and year (where appropriate); all variables are dummy variables; data 
are weighted; models are probit regressions, reporting marginal effects; data are pooled but do not include data 
from 2009; significance reported at *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. 
 
 
Race and class effects vary. Model C is almost identical to Model B in Table 8. 
The results of model D are not immediately intuitive. There is a clear class 
effect on whether someone says their living conditions are better than other 
people, but being non-African has a negative effect. This is not because white, 
Indian and coloured people do not recognise that their living conditions are 
better, but rather that this is an effect of their class, not their race. Controlling for 
class, being non-African has a negative effect. The same pattern is evident in 
Model F (perceived overdependence on government) and, more weakly, in 
Model G (the perceived importance of hard work). There are clear class effects 
on support for continued affirmative action. In this case, the race effect (i.e. the 
effect of being non-African) is also positive, i.e. everyone is supportive relative 
to low-LSM African people. 
 
The regression models suggest that race and class have clear effects on a variety 
of social attitudes. The fact that interaction effects are not significant suggests 
that the effects are discrete. As Mattes (2014) finds with respect to political 
attitudes and behaviours, this does not mean that there is evidence of 
convergence between the African and white middle classes. The analysis in this 
chapter goes beyond Mattes’ analysis to explain why, at least with respect to 
social attitudes: there is a persistent race effect which often works in the 
opposite direction to the class effect. It is not that class does not matter, but that 








This chapter has used data from SARB surveys conducted between 2003 and 
2013 to examine whether the growing African middle class has distinctive 
attitudes around issues of race and class in comparison with African people in 
lower classes, and then to examine how race and class affect attitudes among the 
entire South African population. The analysis is constrained by the availability 
of data in the SARB dataset. The income and occupational data are not 
conducive to thorough class analysis, attitudes were measured on some issues 
but not others, and there are no data for self-identification in class terms. Given 
these constraints, I used LSM categorisation as a measure of class, 
distinguishing between the upper middle classes (LSMs 9 and 10) and the lower 
middle classes (LSMs 6 through 8). I found that the attitudes on a wide range of 
issues of the African middle classes showed statistically significant differences 
to those of the African lower classes. These differences should not be 
exaggerated, they nonetheless point to the importance of class formation in 
reshaping popular attitudes on issues of race and class. The African middle 
classes were more positive about changes since 1994, were more optimistic 
about future changes, and are more likely to view poverty and prosperity in 
terms of a conservative ideology or discourse that emphasises (in)dependence 
and hard work. On some issues, the differences grew over the decade covered by 
the dataset. 
 
The extent of heterogeneity should not be overstated. Most African men and 
women agree that hard work is important for individual success. It is just that 
agreement is even higher among the middle classes than among people in the 
lower LSMs. Most African men and women do not think that the government 
has done a good job with job creation. But this view is much more widespread 
among lower LSM people than among the middle classes. Most African men 
and women believe that race relations have improved. But this view is even 
more widespread among the middle classes than among people in the lower 
LSMs. The measured differences on these selected social attitudes tend to be 
ones of degree, not of complete contrast. 
 
Elsewhere I have argued that the new middle classes claim distinctions that are 
exclusive of the poor, through a discourse that contrasts their industrious 
independence against the dependency of the poor (Seekings, 2014b; see also 
Chipkin, 2012; Telzak, 2012; Krige, 2015). The SARB surveys did not include 
the questions needed to measure adequately this kind of exclusive distinction. 
Nor do the surveys allow for the measurement of differences in consumption or 
individualism, which have been emphasised in ethnographic accounts of the 
African middle classes. The survey data provide a poor platform for developing 




Nonetheless, showing that both race and class have clear and discrete effects on 
a range of attitudes among the total population is important for understanding 
cleavages in contemporary South African society, whilst the precise direction of 
the effects has both reassuring and troubling implications. The growth of the 
black middle classes is associated with the deepening perception that race 
relations have improved. This is surely a positive trend. At the same time, 
however, the growth of the black middle classes is associated with a growing 
perception that employment opportunities have improved since 1994, and that 
the gap between rich and poor has improved. Given that other data suggest that 
employment opportunities have not improved in practice for large numbers of 
South Africans, and that the gap between rich and poor has in fact widened since 
1994, these perceptions of improvement might reflect a worrying complacency 
on the part of the black middle classes. If that complacency feeds into a 
deepened disinterest in improving opportunities for the poor, then the 
deracialisation of the middle classes might impede or undermine the kinds of 
policy changes that would address continuing poverty and inequality in South 
Africa. In short, the growth of the black middle classes might be bad for the 





Appendix: Are these findings robust to the 
specification of ‘class’? 
 
Does it matter whether ‘class’ is measured using LSMs rather than occupation or 
income? As discussed in the main text, it is difficult to construct good 
occupation-based class categories or consistent income-based categories over 
time using the SARB data. Tables A1 and A2 show the relationships between 
the LSM-based class categories and data on incomes (from 2011) and 
occupations (from 2008-12). 
 
 
Table A1: Household income by LSM, 2011 
 
Household income, in R/month 









<1200 pm (poorest 3 deciles) 86 14 0 100 
1201-2999 (next 3 deciles) 83 17 0 100 
3000-3999 (7th decile) 68 32 0 100 
4000-5999 (8th decile) 58 41 1 100 
6000-9999 (9th decile) 39 59 2 100 
10000 + (10th decile) 7 78 15 100 
 
Source: SARB , African people only, weighted data. 
 
 
Table A2: Occupation by LSM, 2011 
 
Occupation or work status (with 











12 74 15 100 
Clerical/sales or skilled/tradesman 
(10%) 
40 56 4 100 
Semi-skilled (6%) 48 51 1 100 
Unskilled (11%) 74 25 0 100 
Unemployed (28%) 77 23 1 100 
Housewife/retired/student (38%) 70 28 2 100 
 





Table A3 shows the results of regression models using ‘class’ categories derived 
from the available income data (for 2011 only) and occupation data (for 2008-
12), for comparison with the LSM-based categories used in the models reported 
in Table 8. With respect to income, I label as ‘upper middle class’ households 
with incomes above R10,000 per month (i.e. approximately household income 
decile 10) and as ‘lower middle class’ those households with incomes between 
R3000 and 10,000 per month (approximately deciles 7 through 9). Occupational 
data cover only respondents who are themselves working, with little detail on 
their occupations; they do not cover people with ‘mediated’ class positions, i.e. 
mediated through their membership of households. I label as ‘upper middle 
class’ respondents in professional, managerial or executive occupations and as 
‘lower middle class’ respondents in clerical, sales, skilled or trade occupations. I 
exclude from this analysis all respondents who said they were either 
unemployed, housewives, students, retired, or self-employed (because the 




Table A3: Class and race effects on perceived progress since 1994, 
using alternative measures of class 
 
 
Agree that race 
relations improved 
since 1994 















‘Upper middle class’ 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06 0.07*** 
‘Lower middle class’ 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04** 
Not ‘middle class’ Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Not African -0.09** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.13*** 
African Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
n  2250 6217 2287 6290 
r squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
 
Note: All models control for age, gender and year (where appropriate); all variables are dummy variables; data 
are weighted; models are probit regressions, reporting marginal effects; significance reported at *0.1, **0.05, 
***0.01. 
 
These four models (compared with those in Table 8) show that the effects of 
being ‘upper middle class’ or non-African are remarkably consistent, regardless 
of whether class is measured in terms of LSMs, household income or individual 
occupation. The only caveat to this is that the relationship between being upper 
middle class and perceived improvement in employment opportunities is not 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The effect of being ‘lower middle class’ 
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is not, however, robust, when ‘class’ is defined in terms of household income or 
occupation.  
 
When perceived changes in employment opportunities are regressed on LSM 
controlling also for occupation or income, LSM remains significant. The picture 
is a little more complicated when perceived changes in race relations are 
regressed on LSM, controlling for occupation or income, then being in the 
‘upper middle class’ LSM categories (i.e. LSM 9-10) is less significant than 
being in the ‘upper middle class’ defined in terms of occupation or income. This 
is consistent with the inter-racial contact data discussed above: Perceptions of 
improvements in race relations seem to correlate with inter-racial contact, and 
such contact is more likely to be associated with having a professional, 
managerial or executive occupation than with having the assets that place you in 
the higher LSMs. How to understand the similarities and differences between 
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